中文摘要：

基于激励相容的可中断负荷管理机制，提出一种新的解决电力市场环境下输电阻塞问题的模型。该模型涉及两个问题，可中断负荷的选取问题和经济补偿问题。可中断负荷的选取通过一个两层优化模型实现。在经济补偿问题上，针对市场环境下信息的不对称性，设计了激励相容的补偿机制，使用户在上报真实缺电成本信息时获得最大利润，鼓励其上报真实缺电成本，积极参与阻塞管理，从而实现电力资源的有效利用。采用非线性互补方法及蒙特卡罗模拟方法进行模型求解，并通过一个修改的IEEE30节点系统验证了模型和方法的有效性。

英文摘要：

Based on an interruptible load （IL） management mechanism with incentive compatibility, a novel model is proposed to solve the transmission congestion problem in electricity markets. The model includes two problems, one is the selection of IL and the other is the monetary compensation for IL. A two-level optimization model is developed to select IL. In regard to the monetary compensation problem, owing to the information asymmetry in market environment, an incentive compatible compensation mechanism is employed. The interrupted customer＇s profit is maximized only when he bids his true type under this mechanism, which can encourage the customer to participate in congestion management. The nonlinear complementarity method and Monte Carlos simulation method are used to solve the model. A modified IEEE 30 bus system is employed to present the validity of the model and the methods.