中文摘要：

以2006—2012年的中国制造业上市公司为研究对象,基于企业与主要供应商和客户关系的视角,本文考察了企业的关系型交易对主审事务所的选聘机理及其审计契约稳定性的影响。研究发现：更依赖与主要供应商和客户进行关系型交易的企业更倾向于聘请本地小所,且双方的审计契约更稳定,审计任期更长。进一步分析发现,这种效应主要体现在更依赖企业在上一年获得标准审计意见的情形,当企业上一年获得非标审计意见时,关系型交易没有对审计契约的稳定性产生显著影响。研究表明依托与主要供应商/客户的关系型交易降低了企业对高质量审计鉴证的需求,本地小所为了增强审计契约稳定性,并维护既有的准租金利益,也会积极默许企业的盈余管理行为。本文进一步丰富了利益相关者如何影响企业对主审事务所的选聘机理和审计契约的文献,也对认识以关系型交易为主要特征的转型经济社会中的审计需求和审计行为提供了增量信息。

英文摘要：

Based on the relationship of between the firms with their key suppliers and customers, this paper investigates relationship-specific transactions how to affect the choices of audit firms, and their cross-effect on the stability of audit contracts. Using a sample of the Chinese publicly listed manufacturing firms from 2006 to 2012, we find that with the crease of relationship-specific transactions between firms and their key suppliers/customers, the firms are more likely to hire small audit firms with the same region （local small audit firms）, and which may lead to a more stable audit contracts between firms and local small audit firms, and the audit tenure of local small audit firms becomes longer. We further find that more stable audit contracts between two parties if and only if the firms obtain clean opinions last year, if the firms obtain unclean opinions last year, relationship-specifie transactions cannot help to increase the stability of audit eontracts between firms and local small audit firms. Our research suggests the firms are built relationship-specific transactions by depending on their key suppliers and customers, which reduces their demand for high quality of audit service, and local small audit firms may actively acquiescence earnings management behavior of clients in or- der to stabilize audit contracts between two parties and maintain the interests of the existing quasi-rent. Our research direct enriches studies focus on the stakeholders how to affect the choice mechanism of firm hiring audit firms and the audit contract, contributes to our under- standing of social networks in emerging markets by providing evidence on relationship-specific transactions with key suppliers and customers and their influence on firms＇ audit demand and auditor behavior.