中文摘要：

在中国，行业行政壁垒的普遍存在造就了一批垄断性企业。它们有着超额的利润，从而使得潜在进入企业都希望能进入政府规制的行业，从超额利润中分得“一杯羹”。那么，究竞是什么影响了企业对行业壁垒的突破？本文基于政府规制的部门利益理论，以2005年到2009年的上市公司为样本，发现企业寻租能力越强，企业越容易突破行业壁垒。具体而言，当企业为国有控股或者国有股权比越高时，越会进入行业壁垒高的行业，政治关系越强的企业也容易突破行业壁垒。文章也发现，企业所在的地区市场化地区发展水平也显著影响企业对行业壁垒的突破。研究表明，尽管近年来国家出台了不少鼓励行业自由进入的制度规定，但“政府之手”依然是影响企业对行业壁垒突破的关键因素，这对有关部门制定产业政策有很好的借鉴意义。

英文摘要：

The industry＇s administrative barriers are nowadays prevalent in China. The setting of license or approval and the mar- ket foreclosure or segmentation have jeopardized the operation freedom of market players especially the rights in the fields of marketaccess, marketexit and commodity sales related market. The mechanism above has fosters numbers of monopoly enterprises which obtain excess profits, attracting more potential enterprises to get involved in such government regulated industry and share part of those tempting excess profits. Then, what on earth has influenced enterprises＇ breakthrough effect of industry barriers？ This paper calculates respectively on the gross margin of all industries related and finds out that the gross margin of enterprises with high admin- istrative and technical barriers on their focused industry is relatively higher, which effectively helps us understand the industrial distribu- tion and planning of local governments and the companies. Further- more, basing on the sectional interest theory of regulation, the paper collects Chinese private listed companies from 2005 to 2009 as samples and came to the conclusion that the stronger an enterprise＇s rent-seeking ability is, specifically when the enterprise is state- owned or the more state-owned equity the enterprise has, the easier it is to enter the industry with high industry barrier. The stronger the enterprise＇s political relationship is, the more likely it is able to enter industries with high barriers to entry. Also, the paper reveals that development level of the market where the target enterprise locates has a significant influence on its breakthrough effect of the barriers. The research of the paper clearly shows that rent-seeking and rent-creating do exist in the process of the government regula- tion. Although in recent years the state has promulgated a number of regulations aiming to encourage free entry into industries, the ＂the hand of the government＂ is still a crucial factor that influences enterprises＇