中文摘要：

本文旨在系统梳理市场设计的内涵、外延与核心算法,界定市场设计与机制设计的概念边界,分析该理论移植到我国的适用性并进行算法改良。作者提出：政府做＂小＂并不一定等于市场做＂大＂,政府去行政化后退出的＂领域＂并不等于市场就会自动地成长和繁荣起来,由于存在名义粘性,价格机制的自动调节无法迅速实现市场出清。也就是说,市场要对资源配置起决定性作用需要一种机制,需要一定条件,需要一个平台,需要理顺政府与市场的关系,由政府牵头设计和营造市场平台,以市场平台促进各利益主体按照自愿原则达成交易,通过双边匹配的市场设计,给予市场稳定配对的交易规则,优化资源配置,降低交易成本,重构信息结构,刺激有效需求,扩大市场供给,走一条以常态化机制驱动供给侧结构性改革的新路子。

英文摘要：

This paper aims at systematically sorting out the theories of market design such as concept, extension, historical evolution, major schools and theoretical character, defining the concept boundaries of market design and mechanism design, coming up with ad- justments for Sinicization and innovating two-sided matching algorithm. The author claims that markets are not capable of growing automatically as the government withdrawals on their own initiative due to nominal stickiness. The automatic regulation of price mechanism can not achieve market clearing quickly. In other words, the market which determines resource distribution needs one mechanism, some conditions or one platform and needs rationalize the relationship between government and market. The government is supposed to set up market platform to show stable pairing rules for lowering transaction costs, reconstructing infor- mation structure, stimulating effective demand and expanding market supply by the market de- sign of two-sided matching. This is a new way that the supply-side structural reform is driven by normalizing mechanism.