中文摘要：

董事高管（以下简称D＆O）责任保险的需求动因和效应是近年来国外公司治理研究的一个热点问题。本文在系统梳理国外学术界相关研究文献的基础上，首先归纳和介绍了现有相关研究的主要理论动因——管理者风险厌恶假说、外部监督者假说、股东利益保护假说和财务效应假说，然后从信号传递和道德风险两个方面阐述了D＆O责任保险对公司治理可能产生的影响，最后在评析已有研究成果的基础上对未来研究进行了展望。

英文摘要：

The demand motivation and effect of directors＇ and officers＇ （hereinafter referred to as D＆O） liability insurance are a hot issue of foreign corporate governance research in recent years. Based on a systematic review of foreign literature, this paper first summarizes and introduces main theoretical motivations, namely the hypothesis of risk-averse managers, the hypothesis of external su- pervisors, the hypothesis of the protection of shareholder interests and the hypothesis of financial effect. Then it states the possible effects of D＆O liability insurance on corporate governance. Finally, it points out the directions in future research based on current research achievements.