中文摘要：

窗饰行为是证券投资基金等机构投资者出于自身利益的考虑,在时期末采取一系列手段修饰其管理的基金投资组合、粉饰自己的投资业绩,从而达到欺骗投资者、谋取更多利益的非理性投资行为。运用2003年第1季度至2009年第4季度的数据,采用基金重仓股的时期末反转效应,对我国封闭式、开放式基金总体样本以及不同换手率样本窗饰行为的存在性进行检验。检验结果发现我国封闭式、开放式基金在总体上不存在显著的窗饰行为,然而对于重仓股中成交不活跃的股票而言,窗饰行为显著。对窗饰行为的研究可为证券投资者和证券监管部门提供重要的参考价值。

英文摘要：

Window dressing behavior means that securities investment funds and other institutional investors try to use a series of measures to dress the fund investment portfolio and their own investment performance at the end of investment period,so as to cheat on the investors and seek much benefits through this irrational investment behavior.Using the data from the first quarter in 2003 to the fourth quarter in 2009,this paper employs the reversal effect of awkwardness of fund at the period end to examine whether the window dressing behavior exists in the closed-end funds,open-end fund and the sample with different turnover rate.The results show that in China generally there is no window dressing effect existing in the closed-end funds and open-end funds,but for those stocks with low turnover rate in the akwardness of fund,the window dressing behavior is significant.Our research on window dressing behavior has siginificant implications for secruties investors and securities regulatory authority.