中文摘要：

基于物流服务组合模式，在一个物流服务集成商和多个功能型物流服务提供商的情况下，每个主体自身的产出受到他人努力水平的影响时，运用委托代理理论建立了物流服务集成商和功能型物流服务提供商之间的优化模型．该模型的优化目标是集成商的利润最大化，同时综合考虑了提供商的参与约束（IR）和激励相容约束（IC）．对模型进行优化求解，得出物流服务集成商提供给每个提供商最优的分配系数和固定支付．结果表明，物流服务集成商给提供商的分配系数与提供商的努力水平正相关，与提供商的风险规避程度呈负相关；物流服务集成商的努力水平是与提供商的单位努力成本负相关，且外生不确定因素越多，集成商的努力水平越低．

英文摘要：

Based on the model of logistics service combination, this paper discussed the logistics service supply chain consisting of a logistics service integrator （LSI） and many functional logistics service providers （FLSPs）. In that situation, one＇s performance is affected by other party＇s endeavor. An optimization model of LSSC is built in terms of principle agent theory. In this model, the optimization goal is to maximize the profit of LSI. The main constraints are the individual rationality constraint （IR） and the incentive compatibility constraint （IC） of FLSPs. Furthermore the optimization solutions of model are given, consequently the optimization distribution coefficient and fixed payment are proposed. The optimization results show that the distribution coefficient is positively correlative with FLSP＇s endeavor while negatively correlative with the risk aversion coefficient of FLSP. The endeavor of LSI is negatively correlative with the unit endeavor cost. With the enlargement of uncertainty, the endeavor of LSI is decreasing. A practical example is given to show its application.