基于需求不确定和纵向约束的链与链竞争环境,识别固定加价合同选择的绩效改进条件和博弈均衡特征,并进一步分析市场需求波动风险、市场规模、市场份额、价格竞争、零售商预测能力及固定加价比例对合同选择行为的影响.研究发现:当横向价格竞争相对较弱,零售终端的市场份额相对较大时,基于纵向约束的固定加价合同是实现供应链系统绩效改进的贝叶斯占优均衡;若此时固定加价的比例相对适中且市场需求波动风险不是很高,或者固定加价的比例较大但市场需求波动的风险相对适中,则固定加价合同是实现制造商和零售商Pareto绩效均改进的贝叶斯均衡;而若价格竞争非常激烈,则无纵向约束的批发价格合同能形成实现供应链系统绩效Pareto改进的占优贝叶斯均衡.
Based on chain-to-chain price competition model which was defined by two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers under demand uncertainty and vertical restraints,this paper not only identified the market conditions of performance improvement equilibriums for supply chain's members when the manufacturer adopted the contract of the retailer's fixed markup,but also investigated the impact of demand risk,market size,market share,price competition,demand forecast ability and markup ratio on the performance improvement equilibriums. The results show that: when price competition between the two competing supply chains is weaker relatively and market share is bigger relatively,the retailer 's fixed markup will improve the whole supply chain's performance and produce a dominant equilibrium and Bayesian equilibrium for the whole supply chain; what is more,if the markup ratio is relatively modest and the demand risk is not very high,or the markup ratio is bigger relatively and the demand risk is relatively modest at the same time,the retailer's fixed markup will realize a dominant equilibrium and Bayesian equilibrium for both the manufacturer and retailer.However,when price competition is very fierce,the wholesale price contract will produce a dominant equilibrium and Bayesian equilibrium for the whole supply chain.