中文摘要：

文章以2007-2013年所有沪深A股上市公司为样本,利用Richardson投资效率模型,并以总经理与董事长的两职合一、总经理任期、高管董事人数作为管理层权力的替代测度,检验了管理层权力与非效率投资之间的关系。研究发现,管理层的权力越大,越能降低非投资效率,包括减少过度投资和投资不足的情况,尤其是能改善过度投资状况。这意味着随着经理人市场的逐步建立和完善,应当赋予管理层更大的经营管理自主权,以促进企业做大做强。

英文摘要：

This paper examines the relationship between managerial power and non-efficiency investment by taking all Ashare listed companies in Shanlghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2013 as the sample and employing Richardson inveslment efficiency model, which uses holding both roles of chairperson of board of directors and general manager, the tenure of general manager and the number of senior executive directors as alternative measures of managerial power. The study finds that： The greater the managerial power, the lower the non-efficiency investment, which includes the reduction of both over-investment and under-investmeal, especially for the improvement of overinvestment. This means that the managemenl should be delegated more pewer in poperation and management to promote enterprises bigger and stronger along with the gradual estahlishment and perfection of professicmal managers＇ market.