中文摘要：

房产税改革的初衷是抑制炒房,而非与民争利。地方政府房产税政策是否行之有效的标准应从征税收入与居民福利两方进行面考量。抽象出两者量化水平建立政府目标函数,同时量化炒房者的囤房收益建立其目标函数,通过主从微分博弈模型分析政府的最优动态房产税政策与炒房者的最优动态囤房比例,阐述了地方政府的行动准则,并获得主要结论：（1）地方政府的动态最优房产税税率调节应尽可能做到与炒房者行动同步;（2）税率调节应遵循：间歇不宜过长、幅度不宜过大、趋势不宜改变;（3）即使囤房行为消失,普征房产税也不会被废止,而是维持一个恰好抑制囤房动机的动态临界税率为宜;（4）为了避免房产税被转嫁,房产税应以高税率开征。

英文摘要：

Government＇s original intention of property tax reformation was to inhibit housing speculation,rather than seize benefit from local resident.Whether local government＇s property tax policy was valid depended on tax receipt and residents＇ welfare.By quantifying them to set local government＇s objective function,also quantifying the speculation revenue to set estate speculators＇ objective function,Stackelberg differential game model was available to analyze the government＇s dynamic optimal tax rate strategy,as well as speculators＇ dynamic optimal house hoarding ratio strategy.The government＇s operative norms are elaborated and several main conclusions are obtained： 1）Local government＇s dynamic optimal adjustment of property tax rate should be synchronized with speculators＇ actions as possible;2）Rate adjustment should follow： improper too long interval,each time slight variation,consistent varying tendency;3）Even if the house-hoarding behaviors disappear,property tax still would not be abolished.It is appropriate to maintain a dynamic critical rate for just inhibiting the motivation of house-hoarding;4）In order to avoid property tax is transferred,high rate should be adopted at the very beginning of property tax reformation.