中文摘要：

本文构建了一个包括政府、保险公司、消费者三方的巨灾保险市场的演化博弈模型，基于前景理论刻画了消费者的价值函数后，对该模型的演化均衡进行了比较静态分析。分析论证揭示：政府的补贴力度、保险公司的溢出效应、消费者自行投入的减灾成本以及消费者的风险感知，均是影响巨灾保险市场均衡的重要因素，并发现消费者受到各种偏差行为和心理的影响，往往使巨灾保险市场难以演化到最有效的均衡。在前述分析结论的基础上，本文就政府对巨灾保险市场的干预和引导提出了政策建议。

英文摘要：

The paper constructs an evolutionary game model for catastrophe insurance market including players of government, insurer and consumers. Furthermore, we integrate the prospect theory to characterize consumer＇s risk value function. We study the equilibrium of the model and carry out a thorough comparative static analysis. The analysis shows that all of the government subsidies, insurance company＇s spillover effect, consumer＇s miti- gation costs and consumer＇s risk perception have significant effect on the catastrophe insurance market equilibri- um. Particularly, since consumers are driven by various deviant behaviors and psychological impact, the catas- trophe insurance market is hard to evolve into the most effective equilibrium. Finally, the goverument＇s interven- tion and guidance of catastrophe insurance market policy suggestions are put forward.