中文摘要：

本文实证检验了我国媒体对经理薪酬契约所起的公司治理作用．在详细阅读17621篇针对经理薪酬的报道后，本文发现，媒体在选择是否做出负面报道时，会同时迎合读者对两种不同类型报道的需求：真实可靠的报道以及轰动性报道．一方面，就上市公司整体而言，负面报道能够锁定经理薪酬契约中的不合理部分，向读者提供关于公司治理水平的可靠信息；另一方面，就国有上市公司而言，负面报道更多关注经理薪酬的绝对水平以及经理与职工的薪酬差距，向读者提供轰动性报道，至于薪酬水平和薪酬差距是否合理，媒体并没有提供可靠的信息．同时，当媒体向读者提供有关经理薪酬的可靠信息时，企业会针对媒体的批评完善公司的薪酬政策；而当媒体向读者提供轰动报道时，企业也会针对媒体报道对高管薪酬契约进行局部修正，表明媒体能够起到一定的公司治理作用．本文不仅拓展了文献关于媒体对高管薪酬契约治理作用的认识，为转型期的经理薪酬实践提供了新的研究视野，同时也丰富了文献对于转型国家媒体报道动机的认识．

英文摘要：

This paper empirically investigates the corporate governance role of the media on CEO compensation contracts and the motivation of media coverage within the context of the transitional China. After carefully reading 17 621 media coverages on CEO compensation, we document that negative media coverage is motiva- ted by both the information demand and entertainment demand of news consumers. On the one hand, media exposures can target CEOs＇ excessive pay rather than their total pay of public companies as a whole to provide reliable information to their audience; on the other hand, with regard to the state-owned enterprises （ SOEs）, negative media coverage, however, focuses on the compensation gap between CEOs and average employees, and CEOs＇ total pay instead of their excessive pay to provide sensational information. When news media pro- vides reliable information, public companies as a whole tend to redress their compensation policy, when media supplies sensational information, SOEs also partially remedy their CEO compensation contracts, which indi- cates that media plays a positive corporate governance role in the transitional China. Our paper extends our knowledge about alternatives of legal mechanisms in corporate governance by investigating the corporate gov- ernance role of the media on CEO compensation, provides new perspectives about CEO compensation practices in the transitional economies, and supplements the literature by examining the motivation of media coverage.