中文摘要：

现代高技术企业面临技术进步快、变革周期短、风险大等挑战,而研发项目投资决策又具有多阶段、不确定性高、信息不对称等特征。基于实物期权方法,结合几何布朗和泊松跳跃混合运动假设,构建不确定性下高技术企业研发投资决策实物期权模型,对研发项目进行价值评估;同时引入委托代理理论,构建信息不对称下董事会和经理人的效用模型,揭示了经理人的最优契约效用。机理分析与仿真结果表明,随着市场不确定强度增加,研发项目投资临界值和经理人最优契约效用均会增加;而非市场不确定性增强会使研发项目投资临界值和经理人最优契约效用减小。对于高技术企业研发投资科学决策有重要启示。

英文摘要：

Modern high-tech enterprises are facing a series of challenges such as fast technology progress, short change cycle and high risk, etc. At the same time, investment decisions of R＆D projects characterize multi-stage, high uncertainty, information asymmetry and other characteristics. Based on the method of real options and combined with the hypothesis of the geometric Brownian motion with poisson jump, we build a real options model on the R＆D investment decisions under incomplete information condition to evaluate the value of R＆D project, and apply the principal-agent theory building the utility model of the board of directors and managers in the light of information asymmetry that reveals managers＇ optimal contract utility. The mechanism analysis and simulation show that the optimal investment threshold of R＆D projects and managers＇ utility will enhance with the increase of market uncertainty while the raise of non-market uncertainty can decrease the optimal investment threshold and managers＇ utility, which has important enlightenment for hi-tech enterprises on R＆D investment decision-making.