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中文摘要：
将治理人、经理人以及制度环境多个要素纳入一个系统,以代理理论为基础,仿真模拟权力发展和惩罚力度两种环境因素对治理人监督与经理人操纵战略绩效信息行为间的交互过程的影响.研究发现,1）经理人处于权力累积阶段时,无论惩罚制度如何,治理人适合选择监督强度的小幅度变化,由此带来的战略绩效信息偏误程度最小;2）经理人处于权力稳定阶段时,如果惩罚力度较大,治理人适合选择监督强度的小幅度变化;而惩罚力度较小时,则适合选择监督强度的中等幅度变化;3）对权力累积阶段的经理人同时施以高水平的惩罚力度与大幅度的监督强度变化对经理人操纵战略绩效信息存在正向刺激作用,对于权力稳定阶段的经理人来说,则恰好相反.
英文摘要：
In this paper,governor and manager and institution condition are taken as a system,and based on agent theory,we simulate the influence of environmental factors,including the type of manager＇s power and punishment strength,on the relation between the rate of governor changing supervision level and distorted information of strategic performance.The results indicate that,（1） when the power is impermanent and contested to the manager,governors should slightly enhance supervision level regardless of the punishment strength,which leads to minimum level of distorted information of strategic performance.（2）When the power is institutionalized and perpetual,governors should slightly enhance supervision level in the background of severe punishment,and moderately change supervision level in the background of mild punishment.（3） When the increase in supervision level is drastic,the manager,whose power is impermanent and contested,could be prompted to manipulate strategic performance information.And it is reversed to manager in the institutionalization and perpetuation of power.
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