中文摘要：

从我国煤炭资源整合中＂国进民退＂的产权契约设置现状出发,借鉴Schmidt、Shleifer和Vishny的研究思路,以不完全契约理论和控制权理论为基础,构建我国煤炭资源整合过程中基于政府规制和内部人控制双重视角的产权配置契约模型。发现对煤炭行业保持着较高规制程度的政府以自身效用最大化决定产权契约边界设置。政府和国有企业内部控制人专有性关系越强,内部控制人越倾向于积极扩张国有企业规模,其对政府的＂绑架效应＂越强,进而降低政府的政治效益和增加代理成本。因此政府宏观经济规制要以必要程度为限,减少对内部控制人专有性投资的过度依赖。

英文摘要：

Considering ＂the state advances as the private sector retreats＂ currency of property rights contract setting in our country＇ s coal resource integration, this paper builds a Contract Model of Property Right configuration for China＇ s coal resources integration from two perspectives： the government regulation and internal control by using the research ideas of Schmidt, Shleifer and Vishny for reference and based on the incomplete contracts model and control theory. It is found that the coal industry maintains a high degree of governmental regulation to own maximization of utility decision. If the speciality relationship between government and the state - owned enterprise internal controller is stronger, the internal controller more tends to actively expand the scale, the government＇s ＂kidnapping effect＂ is stronger, thereby reducing the government＇ s political benefit and increasing the agency cost. So the government macroeconomic regulation is supposed to be limited to the necessary degree in order to reduce internal controller monopoly excessive dependence on specific human capital investment.