中文摘要：

有关“风险承担”（risk taking）的研究是近年来特别是全球金融危机背景下财务学研究的热点问题之一。本文研究结果表明：（1）货币薪酬激励的增加能提升高管承担风险的水平；（2）最终控制人性质和公司成长性会影响两者之间的关系，在国有企业以及公司成长性较低的公司，货币薪酬激励与风险承担之间的正相关关系较弱；（3）风险承担水平的提高能促进公司绩效的提升；（4）进一步研究发现，风险承担在高管薪酬激励与企业绩效之间发挥中介效用作用。这些结论在采用两阶段最小二乘法（2SLS）和三阶段最小二乘法（3SLS）处理内生性问题等稳健性测试后依然成立。因此，本文从“风险承担”这一新的视角深化了有关高管薪酬激励降低代理问题并提升公司绩效的研究，也为中国上市公司尤其是国有上市公司高管薪酬契约设计的有效性提供了借鉴和参考价值。

英文摘要：

The study on risk-taking is a hot issue in finance recently, especially after the global finan- cial crisis. Our empirical results show that, first, the increase of managerial incentives can improve corpo- rate risk taking. Second, the nature of ultimate controlling shareholder and sales growth do influence this relation. In SOEs and firm with low sales growth, the positive relation between managerial incentives and risk taking is weaker. Third, the increase of risk taking can improve firm performance. Finally, we find risk-taking plays a mediation role in the relation between managerial incentives and firm performance. Our results are robust after using 2SLS and 3SLS to deal with the endogeneity problem. Therefore, we extend the research on the relation between managerial incentives and firm performance from the new perspective of risk taking, and our results have important implications for the design of manager＇s compensation con- tract of listing firms in China, especially for the SOEs.