我国现有环境规制侧重于将干预作为清洁技术需求方的企业,却忽略了对清洁技术研发的引导。文章将作用于企业的排污权交易与引导研发方向的清洁技术研发补贴相结合,通过构建理论模型考察二者搭配是否有助于清洁技术水平的提高,并使用我国工业二氧化硫排放权交易试点的省际数据对理论模型进行了实证检验。结果表明:(1)工业二氧化硫排污权交易在观察期内提高了试点省份的清洁技术创新水平,这与理论模型结论相一致;(2)我国试点省份的排污权交易政策未能发挥减排作用,这与理论模型结论不一致;(3)清洁技术研发补贴只有与排污权交易相结合才能充分发挥其政策效果;(4)清洁技术研发补贴对相应的研发投入存在双门槛效应,补贴并非越高越好。因此,为提高我国清洁技术创新水平,政府应注重环境规制搭配,并控制好补贴力度。
The existing environment regulation in China places emphasis on the intervention on the enterprises as the demanders of clean-technology,but neglects the guidance of clean-technology RD. This paper combines emission trading playing a role in enterprises with subsidies for clean-technology RD guiding RD directions,and constructs a theory model to explore whether the combination of these two is conducive to the improvement of cleantechnology level. Then it uses the data from pilot provinces of industrial SO_2 emission trading to empirically test the theory model. It arrives at the conclusions as follows:firstly,industrial SO_2 emission trading elevates the clean-technological innovation level in pilot provinces,which is in consistent with the conclusions of the theory model;secondly,emission trading policy in pilot provinces cannot result in emissions reduction,which is out of accord with the conclusions of the theory model;thirdly,only a combination of subsidies for clean-technology RD and emission trading can exert the policy effects fully;fourthly,the subsidies for clean-technology RD have the double-level threshold effect on corresponding RD input and as for subsidies,it is really not the more,the better. Therefore,in order to improve clean-technology innovation level in China,governments should pay attention to environmental regulation matching and control the subsidy strength properly.