中文摘要：

商业银行作为市场经济中一个特殊的参与者,由于其准入门槛高、风险大、要求规模经济效应高等特点,在一定程度上存在着行业垄断经营的现象。笔者在归纳和梳理国内外相关文献基础之上,从规制商业银行垄断获利的视角,采用博弈论的方法分别针对商业银行产品在同质、存在一定差异和完全不同质情况下银行间达成垄断合谋协议获得垄断利润的情况进行了分析。论证了对于完全同质的金融产品,银行之间合谋的积极性并不高,规制政策应该让银行公布收费细则,防止商业银行之间达成合谋协议;对于完全不同质的金融产品,银行之间存在合谋的动机,但是合谋协议并不稳定,政府应该建立稳定的信息服务平台,防止其通过合谋获得超额利润;对于存在一定程度差异化,但是又没有实质性差异的金融产品,政府应该在加强监管的前提下,逐步放开金融市场,引入外部竞争者,通过竞争提高金融市场效率,减弱商业银行之间的合谋动机。

英文摘要：

The commercial bank is a special participant of market economy. There exists industrial monopoly phenomenon to a certain degree due to the reasons of strict requirements for market access,high risks and the need of scale economy effect. Based on the domestic and foreign literature of concluding and from the point of view of regulating the monopoly profit of commercial banks,this paper uses the game theory to analyze the situation under which the banks gain the monopoly profit through monopoly agreement. The above analysis is on the following respective conditions： the products of commercial banks are homogeneous; there exist some difference; they are totally different. On the condition of homogeneous financial products,the regulation policies should ask the banks to public the charge details so as to keep the banks from establishing an agreement due to the low inter-bank collusion motivation. Under the condition that financial products are totally different,the banks have the motivation of conspiracy and the agreement is unstable. Under the above circumstance,the government should establish a stable center of information service to keep the banks from obtaining excess profit by conspiracy. Under the condition that the financial products are not substantively different,the government should strengthen the supervision,open up the financial market gradually and introduce external competitors to weaken the inter-bank conspiracy motivation through increasing the efficiency of financial market.