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中文摘要：
作为代理成本的一部分，盈余管理会损害投资者的利益。以修正的Jones模型估算我国上市公司的盈余管理情况、并利用南开大学公司治理指数2003—2005年的面板数据对上市公司治理状况与盈余管理进行的实证分析表明公司治理的完善会显著降低上市公司盈余管理水平，并且这种降低主要是由于董事会、监事会、信息披露以及利益相关者等公司治理机制发挥作用的积极结果。这一研究结论具有一定的稳健性。
英文摘要：
As a part of agency cost, earning management can infringe on investors＇ interests. Employing the adjusted Jones model and the panel data of CCGINK over 2003-2005, this paper estimates the earning management of China＇s listed companies and empirically analyses the relationship between corporate governance and earning management. The results indicate that the improvement of corporate governance can significantly undermine its earning management. In addition, such an effect is mainly due to the positive results of corporate governance mechanisms such as board of directors, board of supervisors, information disclosure and stakeholders. Regressions of two subsamples prove the robustness of the results.
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