中文摘要：

由于中央政府和地方政府的产业准入规制目标存在一定差异,地方政府为维护自身在经济发展、结构调整、就业促进等方面的利益,在执行国家产业规制政策时可能会出现一定偏差,即不完全执行中央政府的准入规制政策。鉴于此,通过构建光伏产业准入规制下中央政府与地方政府的博弈模型,对地方政府执行中央政府光伏产业准入规制政策时产生偏差的原因,对中央政府的监督方式进行了演化博弈分析,研究发现：中央政府和地方政府采取混合策略支持光伏产业准入规制政策的执行对双方都有利,因此地方政府对于光伏产业准入规制执行应采取支持与合作的策略,中央政府应积极引导地方政府提升支持光伏产业发展的偏好程度,确保地方政府支持光伏产业的偏好程度达到双方利益均衡,实现中央和地方政府的双赢。

英文摘要：

There are differences in the entry regulations interest objectives between the central and local governments ,the local government prefer to safeguard their own interests in the implementation of the national industrial regulation policy,which may appear some implementation deviation,that doesn＇t fully implement the central government＇s access regulation policy. In view of this, this paper constructs the game model of the PV industry entry regulation between the central and local government, to analysis a deviation of the local government to implement the central government entry regulation policy and the central government＇s supervision,study found that it is favorable to support mixed strategy to support the implementation of PV industry entry regulation of central government ,so the best choice of the local government is support and cooperate with the national industry entry regulation act,to ensure that the local government to support the preference of the PV industry to achieve the interests balance,to achieve a win-win situation between the central and local governments.