在区分自然语言中词项(包括专名、摹状词、自然种类词等)的指示性使用和谓述性使用的基础上,可以对克里普克关于严格指示词和非严格指示词的区分提出系统性反驳。这一反驳基于如下6个断言:(1)在不同的语境中,大多数词项都有指示性使用和谓述性使用,不论它们是做句子的主词还是谓词。(2)对于专名和自然种类词来说,其指示性使用是第一位的,其谓述性使用寄生于前者。(3)对于限定摹状词来说,其谓述性使用是第一位的,其指示性使用寄生于前者。(4)指示性使用和谓述性使用的区分是语义的而非语用的。(5)指示性使用和谓述性使用的区分是对当代语言哲学的新添加,因为它不同于先前已有的其他区分,如指称性用法和归属性用法,语义指称和说话者指称,从言模态和从物模态,宽辖域和窄辖域,歧义指称,以及有关专名的谓述主义。(6)基于指示性使用和谓述性使用的区分,对“亚里士多德可能不是亚里士多德”和“亚里士多德可能不是亚历山大的老师”这两个句子,可以分别给出为真的解读和为假的解读。根据这一事实以及其他理由,可以推知:克里普克关于严格指示词和非严格指示词的区分是失败的。
This article identifies two different uses of terms (including proper names, definite descriptions, natural kind terms, the terms for artifacts, etc.) in natural language, that is, designative use and predicative use, and then presents a systematic objection to Kripke's distinction of rigidity and nonrigidity. It argues for six claims as follows: (1)most terms could have designative use and predicative use in different contexts of utterance, no matter whether they occur as the subject or the predicate of a sentence. (2)For proper names and natural kind terms, their designative uses are primary, and their predicative uses are parasitic to their designative uses. (3)For definite descriptions, their predicative uses are primary, and their designative uses are parasitic to their predicative uses. (4)The distinction of designative use and predicative use is semantic, not pragmatic. (5)The designative/predicative distinction is a new addition to philosophy of language, for it differs from other already-made distinctions, such as referential/attributive use, semantic/speaker's reference, de dicto/de re modality, wide/narrow scope, ambiguous reference, and predicativism about proper names. (6)According to the distinction of designative/predicative use, there are both a true reading and a false reading of two sentences 'Aristotle might not have been Aristotle' and 'Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander' respectively. From this fact and other reasons, it follows that Kripke's distinction of rigidity and non-rigidity collapses.