中文摘要：

以中国沪深股市2007—2013年上市公司为样本,从银行债权人缺失的视角实证检验零杠杆政策对股东与管理层间代理冲突的影响。结果表明：由于银行债权人的缺失,零杠杆公司中因股东与管理层间的代理冲突所产生的代理成本显著高于杠杆公司;零杠杆政策的持续时间越长,由股东与管理层间的代理冲突所产生的代理成本就越大;此外,公司采用零杠杆＂进入＂决策时,零杠杆＂进入＂决策当年的代理成本显著高于＂进入＂决策前一年度的代理成本。

英文摘要：

Using the data from the period of 2007 to 2013 in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock market,this paper examines the impact of zero- leverage policy on agency conflicts betw een shareholders and management from the perspectives of the lack of bank creditors. The empirical results show that the agency costs betw een shareholders and management in zero- leverage firms are significantly higher than those in leverage firms,the agency costs w ould increase w ith the duration of zero- leverage policy,and the agency costs of the year adopting zero- leverage policy are significantly higher than the agency costs of the year before the zero- leverage policy w hen the company has zero- leverage entry decisions.