以2006—2013年我国沪、深两市上市公司公布的定向增发公告为样本,从信号传递理论出发,基于双向信息流的角度,实证检验管理者对待增发公告市场反馈的态度,并利用行为金融学的理论,将管理者过度自信心理纳入研究范畴,考察管理者认知偏差对其最终决策与市场反馈之间关系的影响。研究表明:总体而言,上市公司管理者在进行定向增发最终决策时会以市场反馈为导向,但是管理者的过度自信心理将削弱其决策的市场反馈导向倾向。
Based on signaling theory,this paper empirically investigates the relation betw een managers' final decisions in private placement and market feedback,using a sample of announced private placements from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2006 to 2013. The study takes managers' overconfidence into account to examine its effect on the relation between managers' final decisions and market feedback to the announcements. The analysis suggests that managers' final decisions are market feedback-oriented. Supplementary testing indicates that managers,affected by overconfidence,tend to ignore the market feedback when they make final decisions on whether to implement the private placement as previously announced.