为了精确探索资本监管对商业银行风险承担行为的影响路径,本文建立资本监管约束商业银行风险承担动机、优化风险承担决策和预防风险承担后果这一新的研究框架。另外,本文以中国97家商业银行微观数据为样本,建立SD资本风险内生模型进行实证检验,实证结果证实本文结论突破了以往将资本监管对商业银行风险承担行为的影响简单概括为有效或者无效,使得政策启示更加具有针对性。
At present, the capital regulation based on the Basel agreement has already become the Bible in the commer- cial banks globally. It is common that any decisions should be supervised by the capital regulation. This paper provides a new perspective of commercial banks' risk-taking behavior which can be subdivided into the risky incentive, risky strategy and risk consequence. Meanwhile, we put the Chinese commercial banks under this framework and do some empirical tests. The con- clusion is that capital regulation has different effects on the risk taking behavior which makes the policy more targeted.