中文摘要：

为了帮助无线传感器网络作出既有利于自身收益又能抑制恶意节点的决策,提出了一种信任激励的时隙分配博弈模型。根据收益矩阵对恶意节点和簇头之间的非零和博弈关系进行了认知和分解,指出了破坏行为可以抑制的原因是纳什均衡可以作为惩罚阻止节点偏离收益更高的策略组合。在此基础上建立了博弈模型,然后证明了无限重复博弈中的纳什回归策略成为子博弈完美均衡的充分必要条件。采用单轮纳什均衡惩罚合作性策略的偏离者,从而使恶意节点与簇头的无限重复博弈能够产生合作效应。仿真实验结果表明,根据该模型作出的决策可以增加网络收益并抑制恶意节点的破坏行为。

英文摘要：

To help wireless sensor network make a decision for gaining profit and constraining malicious nodes,a game model of time slot assignment with trust incentives is presented.Firstly,the nonzero-sum game between the cluster head and the malicious node is re-cognized and decomposed according to the utility matrix.It is pointed out that the prime reason in the constraint of the malicious node is that the Nash equilibrium as the punishment used for preventing the malicious node from deviation of the strategy with more gains,and the game model is constructed.Then,the necessary and sufficient conditions for a Nash reversion strategy to be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is proved.The single round Nash equillibrum exerts the punishment to the deviant of corporate strategy so as to engender coo-perative effect in indefinitely repeated game between the cluster head and the malicious node.Finally,by J-Sim,the decision maken by the proposed game model could increase the network gains and constrain the destructive behavior of the malicious node.