中文摘要：

供应链金融应收账款融资业务有效解决了中小企业融资难的困境、扩大了银行的融资服务范围。但近年来频发的虚假融资、恶意骗贷和故意赖账等现象给银行造成了巨大的风险,降低了银行开展供应链金融的服务质量和效率。本文从应收账款融资业务的信用风险规避出发,构建了“银行-企业”两方博弈模型,重点研究了银行对融资业务开展的检查率和惩戒设置问题,并以钢贸企业应收账款融资业务为背景进行了相关参数的数值模拟,分析发现：银行采取10%~20%的检查率、辅以1倍贷款利率的惩罚,能够有效降低虚假的应收账款融资现象。建议监管部门应制定具有足够警示性的失信惩戒机制,并要求金融机构在操作实践中严格执行,同时联合构建信息共享平台。

英文摘要：

When developing account receivable business of supply chain finance, banks are often confronted with cheating loan, repudiation and other credit risk, which results in bank losses. In order to avoid credit risk, we establish bank - company game model, and analyze several key factors that affect bank check rate. With numerical simulation, the paper carries out sensitivity analysis of these factors, and explains two important questions： first, how to set a reasonable check rate; second, how to set reasonable punishment. It makes sense for banks to avoid credit risk and gain a good profit in practice.