中文摘要：

针对电力、石化等区域垄断性运作系统能力因突发事件受损的情况,从运作管理的视角探讨监管惩罚、管理者应急态度和应急决策之间的关系,并以此构造相应的单阶段和多阶段应急运作模型.从理论上证明了监管惩罚的边界和惩罚机制参数与应急决策变量的相关关系,在此基础上对服务和生产两类系统的监管机制和管理者应急决策进行数值模拟分析.仿真结果表明,所提出的方法对监管部门制定惩罚机制、管理者改善应急管理绩效具有较好的启示.

英文摘要：

Great loss would occur when some regional monopoly operation systems（OS）, such as the power grid and refinery, loss their critical capacities after some shock of unexpected events. Therefore, a situation is considered that a third-party regulator, such as public sector, launches the supervision penalty to motivate the OS＇s manager to accelerate its recovery procedure. The relationship of supervision penalty, the manger＇s contingent attitude and decision variables in a single and a multiple-periods environment. Some numerical analysis of the two-types of OS are made. Simulation results show that the proposed method can help the regulator to setup up an effective supervision-penalty mechanism, and also can help the OS＇s manager to make a decision during the recovery procedure.