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不同主导力量下的闭环供应链模型
  • 期刊名称:系统管理学报
  • 时间:0
  • 页码:389-396
  • 分类:F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]
  • 作者机构:[1]暨南大学管理学院,广州510632
  • 相关基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901033); 教育部人文社会科学研究资助项目(09YJC630102)
  • 相关项目:需求不确定环境下再制造闭环供应链协调优化模型研究
作者: 易余胤|
中文摘要:

研究了一个由单一制造商、2个竞争零售商和第三方回收方组成的闭环供应链。首先建立了一个集中化决策模型,然后在分散化决策下建立了不同主导力量的闭环供应链博弈模型,比较了集中化决策和分散化决策下的回收率、零售价和渠道总利润,最后探讨了零售商主导的闭环供应链的协调机制问题,得到结论:在分散化决策下,无领导者的闭环供应链结构最优,其次是零售商主导,最后是制造商主导。然而,无领导者的闭环供应链结构不是一个均衡的力量结构,制造商和零售商均有动机成为领导者。在有领导者的闭环供应链结构下,零售商主导的闭环供应链结构更优。集中化决策总是优于分散化决策,但零售商可以通过设计契约实现闭环供应链的协调,使得第三方的回收努力水平和闭环供应链的总利润达到集中化决策下的同一水平,从而弥补决策效率损失。

英文摘要:

The centrally coordinated system and three decentralized models with two dominant retailers are studied in this paper,the retail price,the product return rate,and the profits of the channel members in the centrally coordinated and decentralized models are compared,and some interesting observations are gained.In the decentralized model,the industry as a whole as well as consumer benefit from lower prices and larger profits when there is no market leadership.However,an individual member has an incentive to play the leader's role,and the market dominated by retailer is better than the market dominated by manufacture.The decentralized decision always take some efficiency loss,so the centrally coordinate decision get an advantage over the decentralized decision.However,we show that simple coordination mechanisms can be designed so that the collecting effort of the third party and the supply chain profits are attained at the same level as in a centrally coordinated system.

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