中文摘要：

在制造商领导、零售商领导以及市场无领导者3种力量结构下建立了具竞争零售商的再制造闭环供应链博弈模型，研究和对比了不同力量结构对回收率、零售价、渠道成员利润、渠道总利润的影响．研究结果表明：回收率在市场无领导者时最高，在零售商领导时最低．零售价在制造商领导时最高，最小是市场无领导者结构．从环保、消费者利益和整个行业的利润来看，无领导者的市场结构最优．然而，制造商和零售商均有动机成为领导者．在具领导者的市场结构下，从环保的角度看，制造商领导的市场结构更优，但消费者和整个行业偏好零售商领导的市场结构．

英文摘要：

The closed-loop supply chain game with product structures ： Manufacturer-Stackelberg market, Retailer-Stack remanufacturing is modeled under three market elberg market, and Manufacturer and Retailer- Nash market. The optimal product return rates, retail prices, manufacturer and retailer＇ s profits and total profits are studied under the three market power structures. The results show that the return rate is the when there is no market leadership, lowest when the Retailer is the leader. The retail price is the highest highest when the Manufacturer is the leader, lowest when there is no market leadership. The industry as a whole as well as consumer and environment benefit from lower prices, larger profits and return rates when there is no market leadership. However, an individual member has an incentive to play the leader＇ s role. When consider market leadership only, environment prefers the market dominated by manufacturers, but the industry and consumer prefer the market dominated by retailers.