供应链中的信息对于供应链参与者各自的利益以及整个供应链的绩效都是有价值的。本文建立了一个供应商两个零售商的基本模型,就供应商是否泄漏零售商订单信息展开,给出了伯川德竞争环境下,不同均衡下的产品定价策略。在供应商最大化自己利润的前提下得出了一个信息非泄露价格区间。案例表明:收益分享率的提高可确保零售商在保证信息不泄露的前提下将产品定为高价,同时,信息保密区间存在条件下,收益分享率的提高会导致信息保密柔性降低。
Information is valuable for the participants’ interests and the whole supply chain performance, it affects supply chain’s performance. A basic model, one-supplier-two-retailers’model, was constructed, taking the supplier’s choice of information leakage as the prerequisite. Different pricing strategies of products in different equilibriums were given under the situation of Bertrand competition; An unleakage information price region was derived under guaranteeing the maxmun supplier’s profit. A given numerical study illustrated that: first, under the premise of information confidentiality, the retailers’ high price setting could be ensured with the increase of the revenue sharing rate; second,if the information unleakage region existed, the confidential flexibility of information would decrease when the revenue sharing rate increased.