中文摘要：

将供应链管理引入需求分布自由的市场环境中，以回购契约作为管理的激励机制，研究均为风险中性的供应商一零售商构成的供应链系统的最优订购一定价决策以及回购契约的协调性问题．研究需求分布自由环境下供应链系统的协调性具有重要意义，尤其是对缺乏充分历史销售数据的新产品，短生命周期产品而言．基于期望收益准则和需求分布自由，分别建立供应链系统、零售商和供应商的上界、下界和最小期望收益模型，并在不同的需求依赖价格模式（加型模式和乘型模式）下，分析供应链的最优订购一定价决策以及回购契约的协调性．研究发现，供应链系统的期望收益在由上界向下界乃至退化为最小期望收益时，回购契约的协调能力逐渐增强．即，在上界期望收益模型中，回购契约无法协调供应链系统；在下界期望收益模型中，存在唯一的一组回购契约参数协调供应链系统；在最小期望收益模型中，回购参数是批发价格的反应函数，回购契约可以灵活地协调供应链系统．

英文摘要：

Taking buyback contract as an incentive mechanism of supply chain system, the optimal ordering quantity, pricing, and system coordination in a single-supplier single-retailer supply chain under distribution- free environment is investigated. The supplier and the retailer are both risk neutral. Researches on the per- formance and coordination of supply chain under distribution-free environment are of great importance, espe- cially for new products with insufficient historic sales data, short life cycle products, and products which are difficult to identify the demand distribution by Probability Theory. An upper-bound expected revenue model, a lower-bound expected revenue model and a minimum expected revenue model are established, respectively, for the supplier-retailer supply based on the expected revenue criterion and distribution-free approach. The op- timal ordering quantity, pricing decision, and system coordination under the different demand-dependent pri- cing modes are analyzed. The result shows that the coordination ability of the buyback contract increases as the supply-chain system＇s expected revenue changes from the upper-bound expected revenue model to the lower- bound expected revenue model and finally to the minimum expected revenue model. Namely, for the upper- bound expected revenue model, the buyback contract cannot coordinate the supply chain; for the lower-bound expected revenue model, there exists a unique buyback contract; and for the minimum expected revenue mod- el, the buyback contract is a reactive function of the wholesale contract, which can flexibly coordinate the sup- ply-chain system.