中文摘要：

传统经济学基于理性“经济人”基础，认为公地悲剧问题是个体理性选择的必然结果，公共品供给需采取与个体真实公共品偏好相兼容的激励机制，并由政府承担供给角色。实验经济学研究则提供个体异质社会偏好的稳健性证据，并在合适的惩罚、沟通交流和声誉等机制下提供诸多可以实现公共品自愿供给的实验证据，表明群体或自愿组织也可作为公共品供给主体。这些公共品实验研究为现实公共治理创新提供更为科学的偏好基础和公共治理思路。

英文摘要：

Basing on the traditional economics, the tragedy of commons was the inescapable result in the rational choices of public goods. The incentive mechanism for public goods provision should be compatible with the individuals＇ true preference for public goods, and the government should play as a protagonist in the provision of public goods. However, experimental economics provided huge of evidences for the heterogeneity of individuals＇ social preferences, and also found that voluntary contribution for public goods could be achieved in a high level under suitable mechanism such as punishment, communication and reputation, which indicated that group members or voluntary organization could play important role in the provision of public goods. These studies established a more scientific basis for the reconstruction and innovation of public governance.