中文摘要：

文章应用现代博弈理论构建了大股东与监管方之间的监管博弈模型,并通过构造双方的效用函数来分析博弈主体的行为选择。分析表明：当大股东资金占用监管着力于治本、清欠方式明确并有创新指导、监管频率较高、监管权限与监管对象的耦合度较高、处罚对象适切、处罚力度较强时,监管政策有助于激励大股东减少资金占用而取得良好的监管效果。而现有监管政策对上述着力点的关注偏差,应是大股东资金占用问题尚未根治的原因所在。

英文摘要：

Based on the modern game theory,the paper constructs a game analysis model for controlling shareholders＇cash embezzlements,and builds controlling shareholders＇utilities function to anticipate controlling shareholders＇behavior choice.The analysis shows that when（1） cash embezzlement supervision focuses on permanent cure,（2） discharge means is clear and definite and bears some innovation,（3） supervision frequency is high,（4） supervision authorities limit can couple with supervision object,and（5） punishment object is correct and suitable and when punish vigor is strong,supervision policies can stimulate controlling shareholders to decrease their cash embezzlements and acquire good supervision effects.According to the key points mentioned above,the deviation of supervision policies is the cause for the failure of Chinese listed companies＇cash embezzlement supervision.