中文摘要：

经典并购理论认为,并购者以追求协同效应为目的.我国证券市场民企收购国有控股上市公司控制权的一些并购案例却显示出相反的情形--并购者利用其控制性地位获取巨额的控制权私人收益直至掏空上市公司,并购的异化由此形成.在文献回顾的基础上,文章以发行管制、股权分置、并购监管不力和会计准则存在漏洞为制度背景,构建了一个以预期控制权私人净收益函数为核心内容,能够解释我国证券市场并购异化现象的民企收购国有控股上市公司控制权理性决策模型,随后对民企收购国有控股上市公司控制权理性决策模型的众多影响因子进行了分析,并就此引伸出了治理并购异化的若干政策含义.

英文摘要：

The classical theorem of M ＆ A argues that, the bidders are always looking for the synergy effects. But some cases of Chinese securities market show the conditions against the classical theorem, the individual-founded bidders make full use of its control rights of stateowned and controlled listed corporations, and look after all kinds of possible private benefits until the corporations are tunneled up. The dissimilation of M ＆ A has been existed. On the base of literature review, the paper constructs a theoretical model, which is mainly constituted by the expected net private benefits function in order to explain the dissimilation phenomenon of Chinese M ＆ A. Thereafter; the paper anatomizes related factors of the model, and extends the meaning of its policy implication.