中文摘要：

本文从地方官员任期的角度探讨企业产能过剩的成因，利用世界银行中国企业调查数据对地方官员任期与产能利用率之间的关系进行了实证检验。研究结果显示：任期的第4—5年为地方官员晋升的关键时期．与其他年份相比．在该时期地方官员晋升的机率较高。为了追求经济绩效，地方官员在该时期有激励向企业提供相对较多的土地和融资优惠。与非本地提拔的官员相比．本地提拔的官员配置资源的能力更强．能够给企业提供更多的土地和融资优惠。与其他企业相比，国有企业获取土地和融资更为便利。当获取关键性资源的成本降低时，企业有扩张产能投资的冲动。导致产能利用率下降．形成过剩产能。为此，应根据整个任期内的平均表现对官员进行考核和选拔．构建多元化的地方官员绩效考核指标体系，适当加强地方官员异地交流，积极培育土地和金融等要素市场．强化国有企业预算约束。

英文摘要：

This paper discusses the causes of enterprise excess capacity from the perspective of the term of local officials, and an empirical test is made by using the data of World Bank China-enterprise survey. The results show that the 4th-5th year of tenure is the key period of promotion for the local officials, compared with other periods of tenure, local officials have a higher probability of promotion during this period. In order to improve economic performance, local officials have incentives to provide relatively more land and financing to enterprises in this period. Compared with the officials improved from other city, officials improved from local city have more ability to allocation resources and can provide more land and financing resources to enterprise. Compared with other enterprises, state-owned enterprises can get land and finance easier. When the costs of key resources reduced, enterprises have incentive to expand production capacity, leading a decline of capacity utilization rate, and then excess capacity formatted. Therefore, the evaluation and promotion of local officials should base on the comprehensive performance in their entire tenure, construct diversified index system of performance evaluation of local officials, improve the exchange between remote officials appropriately, cultivate the market of land and financial and other factors, strengthen the budget constraint of state owned enterprises.