中文摘要：

股东持股模式的不同造成公司股权结构的差异,其中的一个重要特征是,所有权与控制权的分离。利用2003-2010上市公司数据,本文从治理效率、市场价值和股利分配等角度对公司所有权和控制权的分离进行了系统考察。研究发现,当控股股东的所有权较低而控制权较高时,公司治理的效率下降,表现为公司业绩变差时不能及时更换不称职高管,并减弱了高管薪酬与公司业绩的敏感性。进一步的分析显示,由于与其他小股东的代理冲突严重,所有权与控制权相分离公司的市场价值较低。最后,鉴于控股股东在公司的剩余收益较小,所有权与控制权分离公司倾向于发放更少的股利。

英文摘要：

Different patterns of shareholdings lead to different firms＇ ownership structures. One characteristic is the separation of cash-flow rights and control rights. Using the data of listed companies from 2003 to 2010,we investigate the effect of such separation on corporate governance,market value and dividend payment. We find that the separation of cash-flow rights and control rights decreases corporate governance efficiency,presenting a low possibility of replacing managers when firm performance is poor and reducing the relationship between manager compensation and firm performance. Further,the higher the separation of cash-flow rights and control rights,the lower the firm value. Finally,the separation of cash-flow rights and control rights decreases firms＇ dividend payout.