中文摘要：

以博弈论为理论基础，构建了研发补贴与污染排放税收下的企业研发模型，研究了减排目标下企业的最优研发水平、最优研发补贴和最优污染排放税收。研究结果显示：适当的污染排放税收有利于企业研发投入和产量的提高；研发补贴不会对企业的研发投入产生“排挤效应”，可以较大程度上提高企业研发投入的积极性；企业对环境的污染需控制在社会可接受收的范围内，否则，企业的生产活动会被政府停止。

英文摘要：

On the basis of game theory, an enterprise R＆D model under conditions of R＆D subsidy and pollution emission tax has been constructed. With the goal of emission reduction, optimal R＆D level, optimal R＆D subsidy, and optimal pollution emission tax for the enterprises are studied. The research results show that appropriate emission tax is of benefit to the improvement of the R＆D investment and output of enterprises ; the R＆D subsidy is able to eliminate the effect of push aside and improve the R＆D investment greatly. The environment pollution must be controlled in the scope of social acceptable; otherwise, the enterprise production activities will be ultimately stopped by the government.