中文摘要：

研究了创新成功时间不确定条件下企业R＆D模式选择问题。研究发现,在R＆D投资不对称情况下,只有当企业的投资具有上限时,企业才有投资的积极性;通过对R＆D卡特尔和研发RJV两种研发合作机制的研究,发现在研发投资不对称情况下,企业趋于非合作研发的方式;当企业决定进行研发合作时,企业选择研发合作的方式取决于形成研发RJV获得的额外利润与形成研发RJV所付出的成本比较。只有当两者之差大于零时,企业才会选择研发RJV的合作方式。同时,研发成果溢出的速度也会影响企业的研发投入,企业在R＆D方式的选择上不仅要考虑技术溢出的速度还要衡量R＆D投资的未来报酬水平。

英文摘要：

This paper studies the cooperative and non-cooperative RD Games of Duopoly firms whose innovation date is impacted by the RD investments and discusses the equilibrium profits under the asymmetry investment in RD,we find that when the RD investment has upper limit,firm has the positivity of engaging in RD.Through the study between RJV and RD Cartel,we get that under the asymmetry investment in RD,no firm wants to choice cooperative RD.Especially,the firms opt for an RJV if and only if the benefit of forming an RJV exceeds the cost of forming an RJV.The speed of technological spillovers affects the way of cooperative RD.Through our study in this paper,we find that not only the speed of technological spillovers but the future profit of the RD in vestment will be considered by the innovation firms.