中文摘要：

本文选择2007—2011年深沪两市A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了政府补助对高管薪酬的影响,结果发现企业内部存在利用政府补助向高管发放薪酬的行为,并且其目的在于维持高管薪酬而不是增加高管薪酬,即政府补助的对象发生了异化。在进一步的检验中发现,企业利用政府补助发放薪酬并没有带来激励效应的提升,补助本身也未改善企业绩效。这种政府补助的滥用行为降低了社会资源的配置效率,会影响社会的整体福利水平。

英文摘要：

This paper selects the samples of Shenzhen and Shanghai A--share listed companies between 2007--2011 and tests the influence of government subsidies on executive compensation . We find government subsidies are used to pay for executives, and its purpose is to maintain executive compensation rather than increase it, which means that the object of government subsidies has been changed. We further find the behavior of using government subsidies to pay for executives doesn＇t increase incentive effects, and the subsidies don＇t improve corporate performance either. The abuse of government subsidies reduces the efficiency of the allocation of social resources, and will affect the overall social welfare.