中文摘要：

基于业绩基础的薪酬制度是所有者用于减轻代理成本的一种治理机制。选取2007年我国228家家族类上市公司和770家非家族类上市公司，通过实证分析得出家族类上市公司来自家族的高管薪酬、家族高管薪酬与其职工年收入的比值明显比非家族类上市公司高，并且薪绩敏感度低；然后通过家族类上市公司公司治理对家族高管薪酬治理效应进行实证分析，得出独立董事在一定条件下可以提高家族高管薪绩敏感度，但以家族高管的高薪酬为代价，第二大股东持股比例与家族高管薪酬呈显著的正向关系；最后提出完善我国家族类上市公司公司治理的建议。

英文摘要：

The compensation system based on firm＇s performance is a governance mechanism reducing the proxy cost by the owners. This paper selects the data of 227 family and 770 non - family listed companies in 2007. Results show that the compensation of managers from family firms, the income ratio between family managers and the staff of family firms are all higher than non - family firms, and the pay performance sensitivity of family firms is less than non - family firms＇. Then it analyzes the governance effect of corporation governance on the family managers＇compensation, and finds out that independent director system can enhance the pay performance sensitivity, but managers from family companies get higher salary, the relation between the second majority shareholder and family managers＇compensation is positive. Finally, it gives some advice that the corporation governance of family firms should be perfected.