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中文摘要：
运用古诺模型分析了寡头竞争条件下的最优反倾销税率,得出当国外企业和国内企业同时决策时,消费者需求弹性、外国企业的边际成本以及进口国政府与国内企业对国外企业的成本信念影响最优反倾销税率。由于进口国政府与国外企业存在信号博弈,于是建立信号博弈矩阵,分析了外国企业和进口国政府的最优策略选择。得出当信号伪装成本相对小时,博弈的纳什均衡为低成本企业决定不伪装成高成本企业,进口国政府执行单一反倾销税率;当伪装成本足够大时,企业放弃成本伪装,此时政府执行差别反倾销税率可以实现国家福利最大化。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we analyze the optimal antidumping duty rate in the condition of oligopolistic Competition with Cournot mode. We conclude that the elements influencing the optimal duty rate are demand elasticity of consumer, marginal cost of foreign company and importing government and national company＇s belief about the foreign company＇s cost; As there exist signaling game between importing governments and foreign companies, we construct a signaling game matrix to analyze optimal strategy selection of foreign companies and importing governments. We find that the Nash equilibrium occurs when the company with low cost decides not to disguise as a company with high cost and the importing government will take the single antidumping duty tax on condition that the signaling disguise cost is comparatively low. When the signaling disguise cost is enough high, the company will give up disguise and the discriminate antidumping duty tax which can ensure the optimal national welfare.
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