中文摘要：

本文利用业绩预告实际执行数据，从上市公司市值管理角度对上市公司隐瞒利好业绩这一行为的动机和原理进行了研究。实证结果显示，业绩预告会导致投资者意见分歧迅速减少，根据Miller（1977）假说，股价将会迅速降低。为实现市值最大化的目标，管理者有动力不预告利好的业绩信息。本文的研究丰富了业绩预告、盈余公告研究的相关理论，研究结论对于信息披露的监管和投资决策提供了参考。

英文摘要：

Based on the actual execution data of earnings forecast, this paper studies the behavior of hiding good earnings information from the perspective of market value manage- ment of listed companies. The empirical results show that earnings forecast leads to the quick decrease in investors~ opinion divergence and the stock prices will rapidly reduce ac- cording to the assumption raised by Miller in 1977. In order to achieve the goal of maximi- zing the market value, managers have incentives to hide good earnings information. It enri- ches researches on earnings forecast and earnings announcement and provides reference for the regulation over information disclosure and investment decision-making.