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中文摘要：
我国上市公司定向增发时发行价格相对于市场价格普遍存在较高的折扣率，大股东机会主义是造成定向增发高折扣率的重要原因。文章通过对上市公司定向增发定价过程的分解，以定向增发基准日前20个交易日股价累积超额收益率和发行价与基准价之比直接度量大股东的机会主义行为，并检验其对增发折扣率的影响。本文的研究发现：上市公司存在向大股东进行低价增发的事实，在基准价格确定以后，大股东可以通过调整发行价与基准价之比来实施其机会主义行为，从而达到攫取上市公司和其他股东利益的目的。而在询价机制引入后，大股东的机会主义行为得到了有效遏制。
英文摘要：
Compared with market prices, the securities are sold at substantial discounts in the process of private placement of listed companies in China, which is mainly due to the opportunism of large shareholders. After decomposing the pricing process of private place- ment, this paper measures the opportunistic behavior of large shareholders by means of the rate of cumulative excess stock returns in 20 trading days prior to the base date of private placement and the ratios of issue prices to base prices and examines its effect on the discount rate of private placement. It finds that listed companies issue additional securities at dis- counts to large shareholders, and after the determination of base prices, large shareholders conduct their opportunistic behavior by adjusting the ratios of issue prices to base prices, thereby grabbing the interests of listed companies and other shareholders. After introducing price inquiry mechanism, the opportunistic behavior of large shareholders has been effective- ly controlled.
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