中文摘要：

科学评估关键高管的人力资本价值是公司董事会制定激励相容的高管薪酬契约的前提条件。然而，现有研究提出的相关评估方法多停留在理论讨论层面而缺乏可操作性．严重阻碍了人力资本理论在企业中的具体应用。本文突破财务会计资产计价模型的长期束缚．以上市公司关键高管突然去世事件为契机，利用投资者的市场反应来评估涉事公司丧失关键高管的机会成本即关键高管的人力资本价值．并进一步检验了关键高管人力资本价值的异质性特征。研究结果表明：①在关键高管突然去世公告事件的[-1，3]窗口下．涉事公司的股价平均降低1．32％，相当于市值平均损失约1．1762亿元，突显了关键高管人力资本的重要价值。②关键高管权力越大，其突然去世事件引致的市场负面反应越强．涉事公司的市值损失也就越大。说明关键高管的人力资本价值因其掌握的权力大小而存在差异。③区分涉事公司的产权性质后，关键高管突然去世事件的市场反应并不存在显著差异．意味着关键高管的人力资本对国有企业和民营企业同等重要。本研究不仅深化了对高管人力资本价值的认识．而且对高管薪酬政策具有重要的实践启示。

英文摘要：

The premise for corporate boards making out incentive compatible compensation contracts for executives is to properly estimate the value of executives＇ human capital. However, most extant evaluation methods put forward by previous studies rest on the stage of theoretical discussion and are lack of practical operability, and thus dramatically hamper the actual application of human capital theory in firms. Taking advantage of the events of top executives＇ sudden death in listed companies, this study breaks through the long tie of the model of assets valuation in financial accounting, and takes the market reaction of investors to estimate the opportunity cost for a focal firm losing a top executive, i.e., the value of the top executive＇s human capital, and further investigates the heterogeneous characteristics of executives＇ human capital value. Our results show that： ① During the time window [-1,3] of the events of top executives＇ sudden death, the stock price of focal firms averagely drops about 1.32%, amount to about 117.62 million RMB loss in focal firms＇ market value, which highlights the value of top executives＇ human capital to focal firms; ② Managerial power would strengthen the negative reaction of investors to the events of top executives＇ sudden death and result in more loss in firm market value, indicating that the value of top executives＇ human capital to some extent depends on their managerial power; ③ After distinguishing the nature of property rights of focal firms, we find that there is no difference in the market reaction to the event of top executives＇ sudden death between private and state-owned firms, which suggests that the human capital of executives are equally important to both kinds of firms. Our findings can not only deepen our understanding of top executives＇ human capital value, but also provide important practical implications for managerial compensation policy.