中文摘要：

上市公司聘请离退休官员担任独立董事（简称“官员独董”），在中国乃至世界范围内都是一种普遍现象。上市公司通过聘请官员独董能够建立起与政府部门的政治联系，从而帮助其从政府手中获得各种稀缺资源和优惠政策，同时也需要承担提供就业机会、政府税收、官员政治升迁等多种社会服务和政治任务。官员独董给公司带来了怎样的经济影响，这是学术界和企业界长期热议的焦点问题，但一直没有得到令人信服的科学检验。为了探究官员独董对所任职公司的经济影响，利用2013年10月19日中组部发布的《关于进一步规范党政领导干部在企业兼职（任职）问题的意见》（简称“18号文”）作为外生冲击事件，手工收集2013年10月19日至2014年12月31日中国A股上市公司披露的790起独立董事辞职公告，利用事件研究法检验辞职公告的市场反应，以测量官员独董在中国上市公司中发挥的实际作用。研究结果表明，投资者对官员独董的辞职公告事件表现出显著为正的市场反应，而且官员独董辞职事件的正向市场反应明显强于非官员独董辞职事件的市场反应，实际上非官员独董辞职事件的市场反应显著为负，说明相对非官员独董而言，官员独董更多地扮演了“掠夺之手”的角色，进而损害了公司价值。进一步探索公司内外部多个因素对官员独董价值的可能影响，发现如果公司注册地的政府监管强度或者公司注册地所在省市的市场化水平越高，该公司的官员独董辞职公告事件所引发的市场反应就越积极，官员独董的“扶持之手”角色越难以发挥作用，从而更加突显了官员独董的“掠夺之手”角色。但是，并没有发现官员独董的行政级别、行业专长以及公司获得政府补助的情况等内部因素会影响官员独董价值的经验证据。创新之处在于增加了?

英文摘要：

It is a worldwide phenomenon for companies to appoint retired government officials as independent directors serving on corporate boards. With the help of politically connected independent directors, enterprises can build up political relationships with the government and have the access to scarce resources or preferential policies. At the same time, however, enterprises have to take some social and political tasks such as providing employment opportunities, government revenue and officials promotion. Then, what economic effect do politically connected independent directors bring to listed companies ： a grabbing hand or a helping hand？ It is a focus question that scholars and practitioners have discussed for a long time. Yet it has not been scientifically examined with some convincing results. In order to investigate the economic effects of politically connected independent directors for listed companies, this study uses the document ＂Opinions on Further Regulation of Party and Political Leaders and Cadres Working Part-time （Holding Office） in Enterprises （hereafter the 18th Decree）＂ as an exogenous research setting and hand-collect a data set of 790 resignation announcement events of independent directors happening in Chinese A-share listed companies from 10/19/2013 to 12/31/2014. Then this study adopts the event study method to examine the market reaction of the resignation ure the practical value of these politically connected directors for listed companies. t events and meas. This study finds that investors significantly and positively react to the resignation announcement events of politically connected independent directors, which is significantly stronger than that to the resignation announcement events of non-politically connected independent directors. In fact, the market reaction to the resignation announcement events of non-politically connected independent directors is significantly negative. This finding indicates that relative to non-politically connected independent directors, polit