中文摘要：

从承销商和投资者行为角度系统研究了IPO业绩变脸现象。研究发现，高声誉承销商没有发挥对IPO质量的认证作用，虽然没有强烈的证据表明高声誉承销商显著拔高业绩变脸IPOs的发行价格水平，但高声誉承销商对业绩变脸IPO额外收取了不能用声誉解释的高额租金，这暗示高声誉承销商利用声誉与业绩变脸发行人进行了利益交换；机构投资者能够甄别出业绩变脸IPO，散户投资者则不能。在新股定价市场化改革后，机构投资者减少了对业绩变脸IPO的申购参与，散户投资者遭受更加严重的“赢者诅咒”。

英文摘要：

The paper studies the phenomenon of IPO＇s performance deterioration （PD） from the behavior perspective of under- writers and investors systematically. The results show that the prestigious underwriters don＇t certify the quality of IPO company. How- ever, they charge extra higher underwriting commission that can＇t be explained by their reputation effect from the PD IPO, and there is no strong evidence showing they improve the PD IPO＇s offer price level significantly. It implies there is commercial transaction be- tween the prestigious underwriters and inferior quality issuer. The institutional investors are able to identify the PD IPO, while the re- tail investors are not. After the IPO pricing marketization reform in 2009, some institutional investors don＇t participate in the PD IPOs, so that the retail investors are subject to more serious winner＇s curse.