中文摘要：

针对中国财政分权与政治集权共存体制下的地方政府税收竞争问题，利用中国231个地级市的面板数据，通过空间计量分析方法研究了地方政府税收竞争行为的特性与激励机制。研究发现：相较于不同省份的城市，隶属于同一省份的城市在宏观税负、增值税、企业所得税和营业税上始终存在显著的互补性策略互动；而隶属于不同省份的城市各项税收上的策略互动在税改后明显变弱。该结果表明：政绩考核及官员任免制度带来的政治激励是目前我国地方政府财政竞争行为的主要源动力。。

英文摘要：

The coexistence of fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China makes the competition among local governments more complicated. Through the use of a spatial econometric model, the characteristics and incentive mechanism of the tax competition were explored on the basis of the 231 cities＇ panel data in China. The results indicate that the imitative strategic interactions on the macro-tax, added-value tax, enterprise income tax and business tax among the cities in the same province are more obvious than among the cities in different provinces. Furthermore, the imitative interactions on these tax items among cities in different provinces significantly weakened after the tax sharing reform. This proves that political incentives stemming from the government achievement assessment and official appointment system play a leading role in the incentive mechanism of the tax competition among China＇s local governments.