以2007至2012年我国沪深A股上市公司为样本,分析管理层权力和资产专用性对企业风险的影响。研究结果显示:管理层权力与资产专用性皆会导致企业风险的提高,但两者又相互制约,呈现竞争关系。进一步研究发现,这两种影响因素中,管理层权力占据主导地位。分组回归结果表明,在强资产专用性组,资产专用性的超强作用弱化了管理层的机会主义行为倾向,表现为制约关系;在弱资产专用性样本组中,随着资产专用性的弱化,管理层自利动机上升。
Using data from listed in both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets during 2007-2012, this paper investigates how the managerial power and asset specificity influence the firm risk. we find that both managerial power and asset specificity increase the firm risk, but these two effects appear to be complementary to each other and competitive relationship. Specifically, managerial power take over central position in these two factors, in group of strong asset specificity, the regression results of grouping indicate the super role of asset specificity weakening tendency of opportunistic behavior, and these were conditioned each other, in group of weak asset specificity, the motivation of manager self-benefit rises as asset specificity weakening, and his or her behavior appears to be opportunist deviations.