中文摘要：

税收激进行为可视为一种公司代理问题，代理入特征无疑会影响税收行为表现。以我国2007—2011年A股上市公司为样本，以CEO权力作为代理人特征的切入点，探讨其对公司税收激进度的影响，以及作为外部监督机制的注册会计师审计对公司税收激进度的约束作用。研究结果表明，CEO权力越大，公司税收激进度越高；进一步地，纳入审计监督机制后，所聘事务所的审计行业专长对该关系有显著的抑制作用。上述研究结论可为税收政策制定及监督机制完善提供有益参考和经验支持。

英文摘要：

Corporate aggressive tax activities is a kind of agency problem, agent characteristics undoubtedly influences corpo- rate tax behavior. Based on the data of China＇s A share listed companies from 2007 to 2011 as a research sample, this paper explores CEO power influence to corporate tax aggressiveness by viewing CEO power as an agent characteristics entry point, as well as a restraint function of certified public accountant audit as the external supervision mechanism. Our empirical research suggests that the corporate with stronger CEO power has higher corporate tax aggressiveness, and further, after the audit super- vision mechanism, audit industry expertise of appointed accounting firm has a significant inhibitory effect on this relationship. The research conclusion of this paper may provide a useful reference and experience support for tax policy formulation and su- pervision mechanism perfection.