中文摘要：

文章运用处理效应（treatment effect）模型,从财务困境视角研究了政府干预对管理者自利行为的影响。研究发现,当政府干预程度较低时,相对于未发生财务困境的公司,困境公司管理者的自利行为会有所减弱;但当政府干预程度增强时,困境公司管理者自利行为减弱的程度将趋缓。对于政府控制的公司,当金融机构信贷决策受到政府干预的影响较弱时,财务困境期间管理者自利行为会有所减弱;随着政府对金融机构信贷决策干预程度的加强,困境公司管理者自利行为趋于严重。对于非政府控制的公司,困境期间管理者自利行为对金融机构信贷决策的自主性并不敏感。

英文摘要：

This paper employs the treatment effect model to investigate the effect of government intervention on management self-interest behavior from the angle of financial dilemma.The results indicate that under low level of government intervention,management self-interest behavior in companies with financial dilemma is weakening compared to companies without financial dilemma;the stronger the level of government intervention is,the smaller the weakening level of management self-interest behavior is.As for government-controlled companies,management self-interest behavior in companies with financial dilemma is weakening when government intervention weakly affect the credit decision-making of financial institutions;as the government intervention on the credit decision-making of financial institutions strengthens,the management self-interest behavior in companies with financial dilemma becomes more serious.In non-government controlled companies,the management self-interest behavior in companies with financial dilemma is not sensitive to financial institutions＇ autonomy in credit decision-making.